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Abstract Modern machine learning is migrating to the era of complex models, which
requires a plethora of well-annotated data. While crowdsourcing is a promising tool
to achieve this goal, existing crowdsourcing approaches barely acquire a sufficient
amount of high-quality labels. In this paper, motivated by the “Guess-with-Hints”
answer strategy from the Millionaire game show, we introduce the hint-guided
approach into crowdsourcing to deal with this challenge. Our approach encourages
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2 Bo Han* et al.
workers to get help from hints when they are unsure of questions. Specifically, we
propose a hybrid-stage setting, consisting of the main stage and the hint stage. When
workers face any uncertain question on the main stage, they are allowed to enter the
hint stage and look up hints before making any answer. A unique payment mechanism
that meets two important design principles for crowdsourcing is developed. Besides,
the proposed mechanism further encourages high-quality workers less using hints,
which helps identify and assigns larger possible payment to them. Experiments are
performed on Amazon Mechanical Turk, which show that our approach ensures a
sufficient number of high-quality labels with low expenditure and detects high-quality
workers.
Keywords Game Theory · Computational Modeling · Crowdsourcing · Quality
Control · Human Factors
1 Introduction
Huge and complex models are popularly used in today’s machine learning
applications, since they can take advantage of big data to get better performance.
Indeed, they have significantly boosted performance of many important tasks, such
as image classification (Russakovsky et al, 2015), speech recognition (Hinton et al,
2012), dialogue systems (Sordoni et al, 2015) and autonomous driving (Bojarski et al,
2016). More recently, they even beat a human champion by a large margin in the game
Go (Silver et al, 2016). However, a primary question arises: how can we provide
sufficient fuel (a plethora of annotated data) to propel our rocket (complex models)?
The most appealing way may be the crowdsourcing technology (Russakovsky et al,
2015; Zhong et al, 2015; Wang and Zhou, 2016; Wang et al, 2017), since the process
of annotations is convenient and the cost of annotations is very cheap.
While crowdsourcing techniques have been commonly used in many commercial
platforms, such as Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT), the quality of crowdsourced
labels is not satisfactory (Ipeirotis et al, 2010). The reasons are that workers may not
be domain experts (Vuurens et al, 2011; Yan et al, 2014; Rodrigues et al, 2014). For
example, it is hard for an average person to distinguish some professional tasks, such
as labeling bird images or medical data (Wais et al, 2010). Besides, some workers
can just be spammers, who response questions with arbitrary answers (Difallah et al,
2012; Raykar and Yu, 2012). Such low-quality labels inevitably degenerates the
performance of subsequent learning models (Natarajan et al, 2013; Sukhbaatar et al,
2015; Han et al, 2016). For instance, noisy labels degrade the accuracy of deep neural
networks by 20% to 40% (Patrini et al, 2017; Yu et al, 2017b,a).
The previous efforts have extensively focused on statistical inferences, which
aggregate crowdsourced labels when they are already collected (Karger et al, 2011;
Liu et al, 2012; Chen et al, 2013; Zhou et al, 2014; Tian and Zhu, 2015; Zhang et al,
2016b). However, as crowdsourced labels are intrinsically noisy, statistical inferences
are hard to guarantee that aggregated labels are reliable. In order to improve the
label quality, recently, many researchers resort to a complementary direction, namely
proposing approaches controlling the process of label collection (Singla et al, 2015;
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Litman et al, 2015; Chen et al, 2016; Pennock et al, 2016; Zheng et al, 2015; Fan
et al, 2015; Han et al, 2017).
These approaches aim to encourage workers to provide more reliable labels at the
stage of collection. For example, the skip-based approach encourages workers to skip
uncertain tasks. However, if many tasks are difficult, the label requester may collect
only a few labels, which are not enough for subsequent learning models (Shah and
Zhou, 2015; Ding and Zhou, 2017). The self-corrected approach encourages workers
to check whether they need to correct their answers after looking at references.
However, references consisting of responses from other workers are noisy, which may
mislead workers. Moreover, this approach is not realized on crowdsourcing platforms
(Shah and Zhou, 2016). Therefore, existing approaches fail to acquire a sufficient
number of high-quality labels on real tasks (Table 1). Besides, these approaches
cannot detect and give potentially larger payment to high-quality workers. However,
this is very important as these workers are always preferred by crowdsourcing
platforms, thus they should be identified and more paid (Ipeirotis et al, 2010).
Table 1 Comparison of related approaches and our hint-guided approach (in bold). Baseline is the
approach used by AMT. Note that, the self-corrected approach is designed theoretically, but barely realized
for real tasks (denoted as “7”), so its metrics of “label quality” and “money cost” cannot be evaluated
(denoted as “-”). However, since its payment mechanism has a multiplicative form, it prevents spammers
theoretically.
Perspective Metric Baseline
Skip-based (Shah
and Zhou, 2015;
Ding and Zhou,
2017)
Self-corrected (Shah
and Zhou, 2016)
Hint-guided
(proposed)
requester large label quantity X 7 X X
high label quality 7 X - X
worker quality detection 7 7 7 X
spammer prevention 7 X X X
platform low money cost 7 X - X
realization X X 7 X
To address these issues, we are inspired by the “Guess-with-Hints” answer
strategy from the Millionaire game show 1, where a challenger has opportunities to
request hints from the show host when he/she feels unsure of the questions. By this
strategy, we introduce a hint-guided approach to improve the quality of crowdsourced
labels. This approach encourages workers to get help from auxiliary hints when they
answer questions that they are unsure of. To be specific, we introduce a hybrid-stage
setting, which consists of the main stage and the hint stage. In the main stage, for
each question, workers answer it directly when they feel confident or jump into the
hint stage when they feel uncertain. Once they enter the hint stage, they are allowed
to look up hints before making any answer to this unsure question. The less number
of times workers enter the hint stage, the higher quality they are estimated to be. To
realize this setting, we provide an explicit “? & Hints” button (the bottom panel in
Figure 1) for each question. For example, when the worker is unsure of the question
1 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Who_Wants_to_Be_a_Millionaire_(U.S._game_
show)
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in Figure 1, he/she can click this button and answer the question under the help of
hints (the gray sentence).
Which one is the Sydney Harbour Bridge ?
A B
(a) Main stage.
The Sydney Harbour Bridge is fixed with a pair of 
concrete pylons at each end of the arch.
Which one is the Sydney Harbour Bridge ?
A B
(b) Hint stage.
Fig. 1 A task that requires workers to answer the question “Which one is the Sydney Harbour Bridge?”.
Top panel: the proposed interface under the hybrid-stage setting, consists of two options (“A” and “B”)
and a “? & Hints” button. Bottom panel: when workers feel unsure of this question and click the button,
the content of hints (gray) is visible, which guides workers to make a choice.
Nevertheless, only hybrid-stage setting is not enough to address all issues. For
example, if hints are freely available in the hint stage, even high-quality workers
may abuse free hints for higher accuracy and rewards. This issue causes failure in
the detection of high-quality workers. Under the hybrid-stage setting, we develop
a hint-guided payment mechanism, which aims to incentivize workers to use the
hints properly. Specifically, our mechanism penalizes workers who use the hints.
Therefore, high-quality workers will answer most of the questions directly (without
hints) for higher rewards. Then, our mechanism assists our setting to detect the high-
quality workers effectively. Moreover, we prove that our mechanism is unique under
the hybrid-stage setting. Since our mechanism has a multiplicative form, it prevents
spammers as well. Our contributions are summarized as follows.
– In crowdsourcing, our hint-guided approach is the first attempt to improve the
quality of labels by auxiliary hints, and detect the high-quality workers. Our
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approach is different in both setting and payment mechanism from existing
approaches such as self-corrected and skip-based approaches.
– We introduce a hybrid-stage setting. Under this setting, we propose a hint-
guided payment mechanism, which incentivizes workers to use hints properly
instead of abusing them. Moreover, we prove the uniqueness of our mechanism
under the proposed setting.
– We further give some general rules for task requester, which helps them easily
design hints for their own tasks.
– We conduct comprehensive experiments on AMT platforms. Empirical results
on three real tasks show that, the proposed approach reaches an excellent
performance on the adequate collection of high-quality labels using low
expenditure. Meanwhile, our approach prevents spammers and detects high-
quality workers as well.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, related literature
is presented. Section 3 introduces the novel setup in crowdsourcing, namely the
hybrid-stage setting. In Section 4, we propose a hint-guided payment mechanism
under this setting. In Section 5, we provide the experiment setup and empirical results
related to three real-world tasks. The conclusions are given in Section 6.
2 Related Literature
2.1 Post-Processed Approach
In crowdsourcing, the statistical inference (post-processed) approach is popularly
used to improve the quality of labels (Zhang et al, 2016a). Such approach tries to
find the correct label for each question only after noisy labels being collected from
the platform. Many methods have been developed under this approach.
For example, Raykar et al (2010) presented a two-coin probabilistic model,
where each worker’s labels are generated by flipping the ground-truth labels with
a certain probability. Yan et al (2010) extended this two-coin model by setting
the dynamic flipping probability associated with samples. Kajino et al (2012)
formulated a probabilistic multi-task model, where each worker is considered as a
task. Zhou et al (2012) proposed a minimax entropy model. Bi et al (2014) employed
a mixture probabilistic model for worker annotations, which learns a prediction
model directly. Tian and Zhu (2015) extended weighted Majority Voting by the
max-margin principle, which provides a geometric interpretation of crowdsourcing
margin. However, as labels are intrinsically noisy, it is hard for this type of approach
to obtain a sufficient among of correct labels with statistical inference.
2.2 Pre-Processed Approach
While previous efforts have extensively focused on several statistical inferences,
pre-processing approach has been recently developed as an alternative way to
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improve label quality. Namely, the crowdsourced setting is coupled with the payment
mechanism, which incentivizes workers to provide more reliable labels at the stage
of label collection. Thus, unlike post-processed approach, pre-processed one can
directly reduce the noise in obtained labels. Moreover, post-processed approach can
be used to further reduce the noise in labels after they are obtained by the pre-
processed approach.
In this paper, we target the pre-processed approach from the perspective of
machine learning (Buhrmester et al, 2011; Singla and Krause, 2013; Goel et al, 2014;
Ho et al, 2015; Lambert et al, 2015; Shah and Zhou, 2015; Ding and Zhou, 2017). The
most related works are the skip-based (Shah and Zhou, 2015; Ding and Zhou, 2017)
and self-corrected approaches (Shah and Zhou, 2016). In the skip-based approach,
workers are allowed to select a skip option based on their confidence for each
question. However, this in turn leads to insufficient label quantity. A two-stage setting
is used in the self-corrected approach. Workers firstly answer all questions in the first
stage, and then they are allowed to correct their first-stage answers after looking at a
reference in the second stage. However, references consisting of responses from other
workers are noisy, which may mislead workers to providing incorrect labels. Besides,
as a reference needs to be set for each task, such a setting is not supported by the AMT
platform and only simulation results are reported in Shah and Zhou (2016). Finally,
neither the skip-based nor self-corrected approaches can identify worker quality as
our approach.
The pre-processed approach was also considered in the database area, but the
focus is different. Normally, their research is to dynamically assign the optimal K
(≤ N) problems to each worker by his/her work quality, where N is the total number
of problems to be annotated (Zheng et al, 2015; Fan et al, 2015). Thus, worker quality
control plays an fundamental role in the quality of crowdsourcing from the viewpoint
of database.
2.3 Worker Quality Control
As workers’ quality has huge impact on the obtained labels, many researchers tried to
improve label quality by offering better control over workers’ quality. For example,
Raykar and Yu (2012) considered detecting spammers or adversarial behavior, and
tried to eliminate them in the following iterations or phases. However, this method
does not consider how to detect high-quality workers. Then, Joglekar et al (2013)
devised techniques to generate confidence intervals for worker error rate estimates,
thereby enabling a better evaluation of worker quality. However, this method is
complex to be deployed. For our hybrid-stage setting, the less number of times
workers enter the hint stage, the higher quality they are estimated to be.
3 Problem Setup
Inspired by the “Guess-with-Hints” answer strategy, we introduce the hint-guided
approach to improve the quality of crowdsourced labels and detect the high-quality
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workers at the same time. This approach encourages workers to get help from the
useful hints when they answer uncertain questions (Figure 1). Specifically, we realize
this approach in Section 3.1, including the hybrid-stage setting and the payment
mechanism. Then, easy usage of hints is discussed in Section 3.2. Finally, the
rationality of our design is discussed in Section 3.3.
3.1 Hint-guided Approach
Here, we describe our hint-guided approach from the following four aspects.
3.1.1 Hybrid-stage Setting
We first set up definitions for the hybrid-stage setting that consists of the main
stage and the hint stage. To model our setting, let us consider a simple example:
each worker answers N binary-valued (objective) questions, and each question has
precisely one correct answer, either “A” or “B”. Therefore, for every question
i ∈ {1, . . . ,N}, a worker chooses an answer matching his/her own belief under the
following hybrid-stage setting.
– The main stage (Figure 1(a)): For question i, he/she should be incentivized
to select the option that he/she feels confident. When he/she feels unsure and
clicks the “? & Hints” button, he/she jumps into the hint stage formalized by
the “H” option, namely,
select

“A” if PA,i ∈ [ 12 + ε,1)
“B” if PA,i ∈ (0, 12 − ε]
“H” otherwise
,
where ε ∈ [0, 12 ) models the worker’s uncertainty degree in this stage, PA,i is
the probability of the worker’s belief that the answer to the ith question is “A”
(i.e., the probability that the worker believes “A” is the correct answer for the
ith question).
– The hint stage (Figure 1(b)): When he/she feels unsure of the question, the
worker clicks the “? & Hints” button. This means that he/she enters the hint
stage. Then, the worker picks up “A” or “B” according to
select
{
“A” if PA|H,i ∈ [T,1)
“B” if PB|H,i ∈ [T,1)
,
where T ∈ ( 12 ,1) is the predefined threshold value of the worker’s belief in the
hint stage, PA|H,i is the probability of the worker’s belief that the answer to the
ith question is “A” given hints, and PB|H,i is the probability of the worker’s belief
that the answer to the ith question is “B” given hints (PB|H,i = 1−PA|H,i).
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The above modeling of the decision process is also summarized in Figure 2. As
we can see, ε controls the decision in the main stage and the hint stage depends on
T . When ε is large, i.e., ε → 12 , more workers need hints to make their decision for
each question. When ε is smaller, i.e., ε→ 0, fewer workers need hints to make their
decision for each question. Once the worker enters the hint stage, when T is set to
a large value, i.e., T → 1, he/she will become more confident to make his/her final
decision for each question. When T is set to a small value, i.e., T → 12 , he/she will be
less confident to make his/her final decision for each question.
A BH
A B
Q
Hint Stage
Main Stage
𝑷𝑨|𝒊 >
𝟏
𝟐
+ Ɛ 𝑷𝑨|𝒊 <
𝟏
𝟐
− Ɛ
𝑷𝑨|𝑯 > 𝑻 𝑷𝑩|𝑯 > 𝑻
Controlled by Ɛ
Controlled by 𝑇
Otherwise
Fig. 2 Mathematical model of the decision process under our hybrid-stage setting.
Note that, ε is decided by T according to Proposition 2 in Section 4.2, and
T is controlled by a mechanism designer. The choice of T is based on different
applications and given to us. In the experiments, we empirically choose T = 0.75
due to the qualitative psychology (Smith, 2007).
3.1.2 Model Assumption
Based on the hybrid-stage setting, we will introduce the corresponding payment
mechanism, where it is rooted in the following assumption.
Assumption 1 (A). There are G “gold standard” questions (1≤ G≤ N), of which
answers are known to the requester, uniformly distributed at random positions
among all N questions;
(B). Each worker aims to maximize his/her expected payment for N questions;
Assumption 1 is a standard one in analyzing pre-processed approaches for
crowdsourcing (Shah and Zhou, 2015, 2016; Zhang et al, 2016a). Specifically, as
answers to the “gold standard” questions are known to the requester in advanced,
workers’ responses to them can be used to evaluate workers’ performance and
decide payment for workers. This is the functionality of Assumption 1 (A). Then,
Millionaire: A Hint-guided Approach for Crowdsourcing 9
Assumption 1 (B) is a must for analyzing workers’ performance. It originates from
game theory (Nisan et al, 2007), and means that each work wants to maximize its
revenue.
Next, we make the following Assumption 2, which specifies our usage of hints
here. It is motivated by the educational psychology (Koedinger and Aleven, 2007),
and means that the hints are useful enough to guide workers to making final decisions.
Assumption 2 Workers have enough confidence to make a final decision after
acquiring useful hints, i.e., T ∈ ( 58 ,1) in the hint state.
Note that the confidence of a random guess is T = 12 , thus T >
5
8 means that
the worker’s confidence to pick up an answer is high after looking at the hint. As an
illustration, let us see Figure 1(a). Workers outside Australia may not know which one
is the Sydney Harbour Bridge. However, after reading the hints (grey) in Figure 1(b),
workers should have enough confidence to make a final decision “A” as the pylons
structure is very obvious. When T approaches to 1, the beliefs from the hint are
maximal, or equivalently, the hint provides the worker with a certain answer.
3.1.3 Payment Mechanism
According to the model assumption, we are ready to introduce our payment
mechanism based on the hybrid-stage setting. Specifically, after the worker answers
all N questions in the hybrid-stage setting, his/her performance is evaluated by his/her
responses to G (≤ N) questions. Namely, his/her choice for each question in the
gold standard gets evaluated to one of four states, denoted by {D+,D−,H+,H−}.
We define the four states as follows.
– D+: answer in the main stage and correct;
– D−: answer in the main stage and incorrect;
– H+: answer in the hint stage and correct;
– H−: answer in the hint stage and incorrect.
Note that “answer in the main stage” means that he/she feels confident in the
main stage and answers directly; “answer in the hint stage” means that he/she feels
unsure in the main stage and answers with hints in the hint stage. “correct” or
“incorrect” denotes whether the worker’s selection matched with the standard answer
in G questions or not.
Therefore, under the hybrid-stage setting, we can formulate any payment
mechanism as function
f : {D+,D−,H+,H−}G→ [µmin,µmax], (1)
where min f (·) = µmin and max f (·) = µmax. We reserve the rights to set µmin and
µmax, where 0 ≤ µmin ≤ µmax. In our paper, the goal is to design f such that its
expected payment for each worker is strictly maximized under the above setting.
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3.1.4 Difference from Previous Approaches
The most related approach to ours is the self-corrected approach (Shah and Zhou,
2016), since both of us have two phases in the setting. However, they are totally
different in probabilistic modeling. The self-corrected approach builds up the two-
stage setting, and workers are necessarily required to enter the second stage to check
the reference answer of every question, whereas, our approach builds up the hybrid-
stage setting, and workers are not necessary to enter the hint stage related to confident
questions. Besides, since each payment mechanism is customized based on some
designed goals (examples are in Section 4.1) under its corresponding setting, our hint-
guided payment mechanism is also different from the one used in the self-corrected
approach.
It would be also interesting to discuss the advantages of the proposed approach
over active learning (Yan et al, 2011) for crowdsourcing. There are two points to be
highlighted. First, compared with active learning, hints in our approach may not be
as strong as querying the ground-truth label; the hint only guides the worker to make
a choice. Second, active learning is constrained to query which data sample should
be labeled next and which annotator should be queried to benefit the learning model.
However, our approach is free of these restrictions.
3.2 General Rules of Hints
Motivated by instructional hints in the educational psychology (Koedinger and
Aleven, 2007), to make the hints useful and reduce interface designers’ workloads,
we offer three general rules here:
(A). The hints should be easily accessible to interface designers;
(B). The hints should be discriminative and concise for workers; and
(C). The hints should be irrelevant to the number of annotated samples in each task.
We adopt the three rules in designing our hints in experiments. We take three
practical datasets in our experimental setup (Section 5.1) to justify that these
requirements are reasonable in the real world. First, for Sydney Bridge, as an interface
designer, we easily acquire the content of hints from Wikipedia, which includes
discriminative and concise phrases, such as “concrete pylons” and “around Sydney
Opera House”. Second, for Stanford Dogs, we build a lookup table as hints, which
includes the characteristics of four breeds of dogs, such as prick ears for Norwich
Terrier. It means that, the hints in this dataset should be irrelevant to the number of
annotated samples, but relevant to the number of classes. Third, for Speech Clips,
the tool is freely available online to roughly recognize each speech clip and save the
concise keywords (≤ 4) as the hints.
3.3 Needs of Hybrid-stage Setting
It is also noted that, in designing the pre-processing mechanism, the high-quality
worker detection is very important for collecting a sufficient number of high-quality
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labels. If the tasks can be assigned to each worker by his/her work quality, the
annotation quality will be increased accordingly. Also, if we can detect the high-
quality workers and give more weights on his/her annotations, we can acquire the
better label aggregation. Here, we show that it may not be achieved by a single-
stage setting with hints (i.e., only Figure 1(b) and no Figure 1(a)). Later, we also
empirically demonstrate this point in Section 5.2.3.
Specifically, by our Assumption 2, if we want to collect more correct labels,
it is more naturally to directly assign visible hints for every single question. This
removes the necessity to have a hybird-stage setting as we design here. However,
high-quality workers are always preferred by crowdsourcing platforms, thus they
should be identified and more paid. Such a fundamental goal may not be achieved by
a simple single-stage setting with visible hints. The reason is explained as follows.
Under the single-stage setting, both high-quality and low-quality workers can easily
read the visible hints to answer questions. Thus, we cannot make a difference between
them. However, under the hybrid-stage setting, high-quality workers may not read the
hints frequently. Namely, the less number of times workers enter the hint stage, the
higher quality they are estimated to be. Thus, we can track the high-quality workers
by our setting.
Note that, only this setting may encounter a problem: if the hints are freely
available in the hint stage, by Assumption 1 (B), even high-quality workers may abuse
free hints for higher accuracy and rewards. This issue causes failure in the detection of
high-quality workers by the hybrid-stage setting. Therefore, under the hybrid-stage
setting, we hope to develop a payment mechanism (Section 4), which incentivizes
workers to use the hints properly. Specifically, this mechanism penalizes workers
who use the hints. Then, high-quality workers will answer most of the questions
directly for higher rewards. As a result, this mechanism helps our setting to detect the
high-quality workers effectively.
4 Hint-guided Payment Mechanism
In Section 4.1, we first give two important definitions which help us to design a
payment function. Then, the designed payment function is given in Section 4.2.
Furthermore, we prove that our incentive-compatible payment mechanism is also
unique under the hybrid-stage setting. Finally, in Section 4.3, we clarify that more
restrictive designing goals cannot be realized here.
4.1 Design Principles
Incentive compatibility (Definition 1) and mild no-free-lunch axiom (Definition 2)
are important to design a payment mechanism for pre-processed approaches, which
are also popularly used by previous works (Shah and Zhou, 2015, 2016).
Definition 1 (Incentive Compatibility) A payment mechanism f is incentive-
compatible only if the following two conditions are satisfied: (i) f gives an incentive
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to a worker to choose all answers by his/her belief; (ii) The expected payment, from
the worker’s belief, is strictly maximized in both the main stage and the hint stage.
Definition 1, which is adapted from the standard game theoretical assumption
(Nisan et al, 2007), describes incentive compatibility. Basically, it means that f
should encourage a worker to select the option he/she believes most likely to be
correct.
Definition 2 (Mild No-free-lunch Axiom) If all answers attempted by a worker in
“gold standard” questions are either wrong or based on hints, then the payment for
the worker should be zero, unless all answers attempted by the worker are correct.
More formally, f (a) = 0, ∀a ∈ {D−,H+,H−}G\{H+}G.
Definition 2 is a variant of the no-free-lunch axioms for our hybrid-stage setting.
It requires that f should not pay a worker who has bad performance on “gold
standard” questions. This helps to reject spammers and keep high-quality workers,
since answers to these questions are known to the platform and spammers are likely
to give wrong answers while high-quality workers are not.
Our aim is to design the payment mechanism f , which is defined in Eq. (1),
simultaneously satisfies the above definitions.
4.2 Proposed Payment Mechanism
In order to design a payment mechanism, we first consider the easiest case, i.e., for a
single question, how the worker should get paid under our hybrid-stage setting. This
helps us to find specific rules under Definition 1 for our setting under Assumption 1,
such rules are given in Proposition 1 below.
Proposition 1 Let f : {D+,D−,H+,H−} → [0,µmax], d+ = f (D+), d− = f (D−),
h+ = f (H+) and h− = f (H−). When N = G = 1, f satisfies Definition 1 if it meets
the following pricing constraints:
(A). d+ > d−,h+ > h−,d+ > h+.
(B). d+−d−1−2ε ≥ h+−h−2ε .
(C). d+−d− ≤ 2T−11/2−ε (h+−h−).
Condition (A) highlights that, for each question, the payment h+ from an indirect
correct answer (after reading hints) should be less than d+ from a direct correct
answer. Condition (B) bridges the per unit income gap d+−d−1−2ε in the main stage and
h+−h−
2ε in the hint stage together, and the inequality encourages a worker to directly
answer questions that he/she feels confident about in the main-stage. Condition (C)
incentivizes his/her to leverage the hints before answering questions that he/she
is unsure of. Thus, conditions (A) and (B) encourage workers to directly answer
questions without hints if they are confident enough; and when a worker has really
low confidence, condition (C) encourages him/her to use hints.
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Remark 1 In condition (A), we cannot set d+ = h+. If d+ = h+, even high-quality
workers may abuse hints for higher accuracy and rewards. This issue fails the
detection of high-quality workers by the hybrid-stage setting. Therefore, d+ > h+
ensures that high-quality workers will answer most of the questions directly for
higher rewards. Under the hybrid-stage setting, whether hints are used can be
taken as a criterion to detect the high-quality workers. Then, d+ > h+ assists our
setting to detect the high-quality workers, which has been verified in experiments in
Section 5.2.3.
From Proposition 1, we can see that f relies on workers’ uncertainty degree
ε in the main stage and their confidence T in the hint stage. When ε is set to a
large value, more workers need hints to make their decision for each question. The
disadvantage of large ε is that the overall payments for workers may be low due
to leveraging too many hints. When ε is set to a small value, fewer workers need
hints to make their decision for each question. The disadvantage of small ε is that
the quality of crowdsourced labels may be poor since more workers avoid hints for
higher payments. Thus, we need to find ε to achieve a good tradeoff such that most
workers are balanced, neither too cautious nor too careless.
However, Proposition 1 only makes use of Assumption 1 to find rules for f and
does not specify the relationship between ε and T . Below Proposition 2 helps to
connect ε and T , and shows a lower-bound of ε .
Proposition 2 Under Assumption 1, f satisfies both Definitions 1 and 2 if ε ∈
[εmin,1/2) where εmin = T −
√
T 2−1/4.
Moreover, based on above Proposition, we can derived following Corollary which
is based on Assumption 2.
Corollary 1 Under Assumption 2, (1/2− εmin)< (2T −1).
Finally, we show when ε = εmin, i.e., the boundary condition in Proposition 2
is achieved, a hint-guided payment mechanism f can be designed (Algorithm 1).
The function g, which sets how a single question should be paid, is defined at
step 1 in Algorithm 1. Note that g(H+) < g(D+) = 1 due to Corollary 1, which
is also in consistent with condition (a) in Proposition 1. Responses from workers on
“gold standard” questions are collected in step 2, and the budget is set in step 3. A
multiplicative form of g is adopted in step 4, which is inspired by Shah and Zhou
(2015). It incentivizes workers to use hints properly and also helps to make the
smallest payment to spammers. The reasons are highlighted in Remark 2.
Remark 2 The benefits of using the multiplicative form is detailed as follows. For
example, a spammer will respond to a question with an arbitrary answer, thus he/she
will get the minimum payment once any answers in “gold standard” are wrong. Then,
for a normal worker, if he/she tries to get the highest payment, he/she is encouraged
to use hints as less as possible. The reason is that the payment for a correct answer
after using hints is g(H+) which is smaller than 1, i.e., g(D+) (Corollary 1). Thus,
more hints are used, the maximum payment for a worker will get smaller. Besides,
such a multiplicative form also helps us to identify and pay more for high-quality
workers, as those workers will naturally user less hints.
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Algorithm 1 Hint-guided Payment Mechanism
Inputs:
1. Define a function g : {D+,D−,H+,H−} → R+, which sets how a single question should be paid,
and , where g(D+) = 1, g(D−) = 0, g(H+) = 1/2−εmin(2T−1) and g(H−) = 0;
2. a1, . . . ,aG ∈ {D+,D−,H+,H−} are the state evaluations of the answers to the G gold standard
questions;
3. Set the minimum payment µmin and maximum payment µmax properly;
The payment is:
4. f ([a1, . . . ,aG]) = β∏Gi=1 g(ai)+µmin where β = µmax−µmin.
The design of Algorithm 1 is further supported by the following Theorem 1. Thus,
our algorithm is the unique one to satisfy both Definitions 1 and 2, and ε = εmin is
also a must choice here. Note that, in practice, the algorithm makes the minimum
payment µmin instead of 0 in Definition 2, if one or more attempted answers in the
gold standard are wrong. This operation is without any loss of generality.
Theorem 1 Under Assumption 1 and 2, f in Algorithm 1 satisfies both Definitions 1
and 2 if and only if ε = εmin.
4.3 No Other Compatible Mechanism
Definition 1 is a must to design a payment mechanism. However, under our hybird-
setting here, there exists another popular “harsh no-free-lunch” axiom (Definition 3),
which is adapted from Definition 2 in Shah and Zhou (2016).
Definition 3 (Harsh No-free-lunch Axiom) If all answers attempted by the worker
in “gold standard” questions are either wrong or based on hints, then the payment for
the worker should be zero. More formally, f (a) = 0, a ∈ {D−,H+,H−}G.
Compared to the “mild no-free-lunch” axiom, Definition 3 encourages the worker
to answer without hints no matter whether he/she is unsure. Thus, it is stronger than
the “mild no-free-lunch” axiom and can be used to replace Definition 2. We wonder
whether we can find another payment function which satisfies this more restrictive
condition. However, below Theorem 2 shows a contradiction to Definition 3.
Theorem 2 Under Assumption 1 and 2, there is no mechanism that satisfies both
Definitions 1 and 3.
Therefore, the “harsh no-free-lunch” axiom is too strong for the existence
of any incentive-compatible payment mechanism here. This further illustrates the
uniqueness of the proposed payment mechanism.
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5 Numerical Experiments
We conduct real-world experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk 2, which is
the leading platform to collect crowdsourced labels. We compare our hint-guided
approach with: (1) Baseline approach : a single-stage setting with an additive payment
mechanism. (2) Skip-based approach (Shah and Zhou, 2015; Ding and Zhou, 2017):
a skip-stage setting with a skip-based payment mechanism. Note that the skip-based
payment mechanism is multiplicative. For the self-corrected approach (Shah and
Zhou, 2016), it has not been verified on AMT tasks, since there is no criteria how to
set references. Therefore, we do not include it in our comparison. Note that additive
and multiplicative payment mechanisms are respectively denoted as “+” and “×” for
subsequent use in Section 5.2.4.
5.1 Experimental Setup
All these datasets are collected by us on Amazon MTurk, where hints are easily
designed according to the criteria in Section 3.2. We conducted three real tasks as
follows.
– Sydney Bridge (binary-choice questions): we collect 30 images of various
bridges. Each image contains one bridge. The task is to identify whether the
bridge in each image is the Sydney Bridge. The content of hints includes
discriminative phrases, such as “concrete pylons” and “around Sydney Opera
House”.
– Stanford Dogs (multiple-choice questions): we collect 100 images of four
breeds of dogs. The task is to identify the breed of dogs in each image. We
build a lookup table as hints, which includes the characteristics of four breeds
of dogs, such as “prick ears” for Norwich Terrier.
– Speech Clips (subjective questions): we collect 10 speech clips. Each speech
clip consists of 1 or 2 short sentences (15 words). The task is to recognize each
speech clip and write down the corresponding sentence. We leverage the open
tool 3 to roughly recognize each speech clip and save the key words (≤ 4) as
the hints.
We verify the effectiveness of our hint-guided approach from three perspectives
(Table 1), and each perspective includes one to two metrics in brackets: requester
(“label quantity” and “label quality”), worker (“worker quality detection” and
“spammer prevention”) and platform (“money cost”). Except “worker quality
detection”, other metrics have been popularly used by previous works (Shah and
Zhou, 2015, 2016). They are detailed as follows.
– Label quantity: we evaluate the label quantity by the percentage of the
completion of three tasks. In the skip-stage setting, worker yields unlabeled
(uncompleted) data by skipping unsure questions. In the single-stage and the
2 https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome
3 https://speech-to-text-demo.mybluemix.net/
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hybrid-stage settings, for objective questions, worker yields (few) unlabeled
data because he/she forgets or ignores few questions. For subjective questions,
worker yields (more) unlabeled data by inputting invalid answers. For example,
they write sentences, such as “I do not know” in the answer box.
– Label quality: we evaluate the label quality from two aspects: (i) the percentage
of correct answers and incorrect answers on three tasks; and (ii) the error
of aggregated labels (Shah and Zhou, 2015). For the ith question where i ∈
{1, . . . ,n}, if there are mi options after majority voting (the tie situation),
and the ground-truth label is one of mi options, then we consider that 1mi
of the ith question is correct. Therefore, the error of aggregated labels is
1− (∑ni=1 1/mi)/n. Since text answers cannot be majority voted on Speech
Clips, we do not report the error of aggregated labels on Speech Clips.
– Worker quality detection: we evaluate the worker quality detection of the hint-
guided approach implicitly, by the error rate (in %) of aggregating original and
rescaled crowdsourced labels. For example, Sydney Bridge (origin) means the
original labels collected by our approach. For Sydney Bridge (rescale), we rank
the worker quality from high to low by the usage frequency of the hints in
the collection of original labels. Then, we rescale original labels by adaptive
weights. Labels from top 20% (bottom 20%) workers have been empirically
rescaled by 1.8 (0.2). The remaining labels keep unchanged. If the error rate
on rescaled dataset decreases, then we speculate that our hint-guided approach
indeed detects the worker quality. Namely, the less usage of hints indicates the
higher quality of the worker.
– Spammer prevention and money cost: we evaluate the spammer prevention and
the money cost by the average payment to each worker. Note that the payment
consists of two parts: fixed payment and reward payment. Reward payment is
based on a worker’s responses to G gold standard questions.
5.2 Experimental Results
We demonstrate the effectiveness of our hint-guided approach from the following five
aspects. Specifically, Section 5.2.1 verifies whether our approach provides a sufficient
number of labels. Section 5.2.2 displays whether our approach provides high-
quality labels. Section 5.2.3 denotes whether our approach can detect worker quality.
Section 5.2.4 indicates whether our approach prevents spammers. Section 5.2.5
demonstrates whether our approach saves money.
5.2.1 Label Quantity
Table 2 denotes the percentage of the completion of three tasks. The first two tasks
(Sydney Bridge and Stanford Dogs) belong to objective questions, while the last task
(Speech Clips) belongs to subjective questions. Objective questions can be answered
by the random guess. Therefore, the percentage of the completion for objective
questions is much higher than that for subjective questions. In addition, the hint-
guided approach has a high percentage of the completion of both objective and
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subjective questions. Our approach inspires workers to finish the questions, ensuring
the quantity of crowdsourced labels.
Table 2 Evaluation of the label quantity. We provide the percentage of the completion on three tasks.
Data set Baseline Skip-based
Hint-
guided
Sydney Bridge 100.00% 74.00% 99.11%
Stanford Dogs 99.72% 58.18% 99.91%
Speech Clips 58.33% 30.00% 75.00%
5.2.2 Label Quality
Figure 3 plots the percentage of correct answers and incorrect answers on three tasks.
First, on all tasks, the percentage of correct answers in the hint-guided approach is
higher than that in the baseline and skip-based approaches. Second, on Speech Clips,
the percentage of incorrect answers is extremely low in the skip-based approach. The
reason is that most people skip difficult speech clips, and answer several easy ones.
Third, compared with other approaches, our hint-guided approach ensures a sufficient
number of high-quality labels.
Figures 4(a) and 4(b) plot the error of aggregated labels on the Sydney Bridge
and Standford Dogs tasks. The number of workers (abbreviated as n workers) is
set to {5,6,7,8,9,10}, since the error of aggregated labels comes from majority
voting among multiple workers (Shah and Zhou, 2015), and the number of multiple
workers depends on varying situations. For each of combinations between tasks
and n workers, we perform the following actions 200 times repeatedly. In each
time, for all questions, we randomly select n workers workers and perform the
majority voting on their responses to yield the aggregated labels. The plotted error
of aggregated labels is averaged across 200 results. We observe that the hint-guided
approach consistently outperforms the baseline and the skip-based approaches,
and the performance gap between the baseline and the hint-guided approaches is
extremely obvious on Stanford Dogs.
5.2.3 Worker Quality Dectection
Table 3 denotes the error of aggregating original and rescaled crowdsourced labels.
For rescaled crowdsourced labels, labels from estimated high-quality workers are
adaptively given more weights, and vice versa. From Table 3, we can see the error
of aggregating rescaled labels is lower than the error of aggregating original labels.
It demonstrates that our hint-guided approach can detect the high-quality workers
effectively. Then, the error decreases significantly on Sydney Bridge, since the size
of Sydney Bridge is relatively small (30 questions) compared to Stanford Dogs (100
questions). We believe that, the informative hints for Stanford Dogs may guide the
low-quality workers to make more accurate decisions. Then, the performance gap
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Fig. 3 Evaluation of label quality. Percentage (in %) of correct answers and incorrect answers on three
tasks are provided. Note that, we do not plot the percentage of unlabeled questions.
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Fig. 4 Evaluation of the label quality. Results on Speech Clips are not reported, as text answers cannot be
majority voted.
between high-quality and low-quality workers is insignificant. Therefore, the effect
of label rescaling is marginal on this dataset.
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Fig. 5 Evaluation of the spammer prevention. Average payment to each worker on all three tasks are
provided. Evaluation of the money cost.
Table 3 Evaluation of the worker quality detection of the hint-guided approach. Error rate (in %) is
provided for aggregating original and rescaled crowdsourced labels.
Number of Workers 5 10
Sydney Bridge origin 38.33% 16.67%
rescale 30.00% 11.67%
Stanford Dogs origin 12.50% 4.50%
rescale 12.00% 4.00%
5.2.4 Spammer Prevention
The baseline and hint-guided approaches are represented as Single(+) and
Hybrid(×), respectively. We provide one extra interaction: the single-stage setting
with the “×” mechanism (Single(×)), and all parameters are consistent. Figure 5(a)
explores how our approach prevents spammers. It plots the average payment to each
worker under three approaches. We have one observation: the payments of Single(×)
and Hybrid(×) are lower than that of Single(+), since an answer in G questions is
incorrect, and thus the reward of the “×” mechanism becomes zero. Since spammers
answer each question randomly, the “×” mechanism used by our approach makes the
smallest payment to them. Thus, our approach prevents spammers.
5.2.5 Money Cost
Figure 5(b) plots the average payment to each worker under the three approaches.
The higher the payment is, the worse the economy of the approach. The payment
is calculated as the average of the payments across 200 random selections of G
questions. This process mitigates the distortion of results caused by the randomness
in the choice of G questions. We can see that, the payments of the skip-based and
hint-guided approaches are comparable but less than the payment of the baseline
approach, especially in the Stanford Dogs task, since both the skip-based and hint-
guided approaches use the multiplicative mechanism but the baseline approach use
the additive mechanism. Thus, from the perspective of saving money, we should not
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employ the baseline approach. Note that, on the Sydney Bridge and Stanford Dogs
tasks, although the payment in the skip-based approach is slightly lower than that
in the hint-guided approach, the number of high-quality labels from the hint-guided
approach is obviously higher than that from the skip-based approach (Figure 4).
6 Conclusions
To improve the label quality, we proposed a hint-guided approach that encourages
workers to use hints when they answer unsure questions. Our approach consists of
the hybrid-stage setting and the hint-guided payment mechanism. We proved the
incentive compatibility and uniqueness of our mechanism. Besides, our approach can
detect the high-quality workers for more accurate result aggregation. Comprehensive
experiments conducted on Amazon MTurk revealed the effectiveness of our approach
and validated the simple and practical deployment of our approach. These merits are
critical for the success of many machine learning applications in practice.
As for future works, first, the hint-guided approach is designed under the worker’s
independence. However, it would become more interesting to extend hint-guided
approach under the worker’s dependence, where the reward of a worker depends
on the answers of the other ones. Second, we hope to extend the hybrid-stage
setting from binary choice to multiple choice with the corresponding theoretical
results. Third, we consider to provide hints from different levels for all questions.
Specifically, we will provide the hints from coarse to fine, which corresponds the
different expected payments. Finally, some workers may still be very confused even
with hints, we may mix up the unsure option in the hint stage to further improve the
label quality further.
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